Transfers of water from irrigation to municipal and industrial uses are seen as a low-cost approach to the water supply problems of western cities. Rural areas of origin protest that market transfers ignore indirect economic, political, social, fiscal, and environmental effects of changes in water use. The capacity of five different water transfer institutions: the market, courts, legislature, special purpose districts, and administrative agencies, to develop and weigh information about indirect and nonuser impacts is analyzed and compared. All five forums are found to have biases regarding the type of information used.
A compromise between the efficiency and equity objectives of regional water policy might seek to facilitate rural/urban water transfers on terms consistent with the support of a viable community in the rural source areas. Such a policy is information intensive because minimizing the area-of-origin cost of transfers requires that the costs be understood at a fine level of detail. Some of these costs, the direct economic benetits of the current rural water user, are well represented in :market transactions; others are "external" costs which are lx•rne by private parties who are not agents in the sale or by the community as a whole. This paper is concerned with how
The values that will concern us are the direct benefit, or willingness to pay of the importer or buyer (DB); the foregone direct benefits of the pretransfer water user or seller (FDB); the conveyance and storage costs of the transferred water {CC); the public and private costs of carrying out the transaction {TC); the cost of the least expensive alternative supply source ( 
Condition (1) requires that the total benefits of importing water (direct, indirect, and nonuser) exceed the total benefits foregone by the exporting area plus the costs of the transaction, conveyance, and storage of water.
Condition (2) requires that the real social costs of the transfer, foregone benefits and transactions and conveyance costs, be lower than the cost of the best alternative, adjusted to count indirect gains from the transfer.
NATURE OF INDIRECT AND NONUSER EFFECTS

Physical Effects ( IB• and FIBa)
The most obvious indirect effects of a transfer on other diversions are physical. These include changes in downstream flows as well as changes in the water table as a result of a change in groundwater pumping patterns. The loss of return flows due to surface water transfers is often incorporated into direct costs by defining property rights to return flows and limiting the amount of water that may be transferred to the amount consumptively used by the rightholder. However, the indirect benefits felt by those whose water supply is augmented by return flows from the importing use could only be internalized by allowing the importer to sell rights to the return flows [Hartman and Seastone, 1970] . Physical effects of a water transfer are entirely site-specific; flow levels on affected streams and water tables may either rise or fall.
Groundwater and surface water are often hydrologically interrelated. A groundwater transfer may affect related surface flows or alter the rate or direction of change in the associated water table. As in surface water transfers, these changes may be in either direction and are site-specific. The costs resulting from the effect of a transfer of groundwater right on pumping lifts or future supplies in the exporting area have been acknowledged in the water administration procedures of several states. in Arizona before 1977, under the doctrine of "reasonable use," groundwater could not be transported off the land from which it was pumped if the rights of other pumpers would be injured. In a designated Critical Groundwater Area, injury was presumed; neighboring pumpers did not have to show that they were damaged. The 1977 amendments to the Critical Groundwater Act of 1948 eliminated injunctive relief for injured parties; the claim of such parties is now limited to a claim for damages, which must be proven IConnail, 1982] . This change in Arizona law is an example of a reduction of the rights of third parties in groundwater transfers to increase flexibility in water allocations. Similarly, decisions made in the legislature, the judiciary, special purpose districts, and state or federal administrative agencies involve a comparison of the transfer with alternatives. Since both the decision makers and the alternatives considered differ among these forums, the information generated by the choice process will be quite different for each. We are particularly interested in the capacity of these institutions to generate information on the foregone direct, indirect, and nonu•r benefits, the values which are lost to the area of origin. In the sections that follow the conditions for a transfer to take place in each of these forums will be considered briefly as they affect the information developed and applied by the decision makers.
Indirect instream Flow Effects
Market Forum
Staying with Young's notation and conditions [Young, occur when the environmental, regional, or conservationist opponents of a water resource project (the right-hand side of (5)) seek support by broadening the conflict. This is done identifying the interests threatened by the project with a class of similarly situated interests that are not actually affected by the particular project. This approach may take the form "Project A threatens the existence of species X. The extinction of all endangered species would have an infinite cost to society. Therefore Project A has an infinite cost to society." This has been called "regulatory politics" (because the mechanism it employs is to secure a regulation that, for example, prohibits projects that threaten endangered species) [Lowi, 1972] . ever commendable on other grounds, the practice of regulatory politics, like that of distributive politics, scrambles the efficiency accounts.
Finally, costs that involve expenditures of public funds rna• not be counted as costs at all in the legislative decision and may even be counted as benefits. (Agencies support projects that will enhance their budgets and prestige regional repre-sentatives support projects that will bring federal dollars into the area.} If the general taxpayer is not organized and represented, the expenditures may not be counted as costs [Cuzan, 
983].
There is a strong bias in the legislative process toward interests that are easily mobilized into political action. Mobilization is more apt to occur when the impacts of a proposed policy are immediate and focused upon particular, identifiable groups. That is, "V" weights values that are concentrated on special interest groups more heavily than values that are dispersed among the general citizenry. Political activity is also likely to be associated with issues which have a strong symbolic and emotional appeal. The widely shared, diffused impacts which leave no identifiable group perceivably better or worse off than any other group are far less likely to generate political activity. Consequently, proposals that offer specific benefits to a coalition of minority interests often prevail in spite of large costs borne by a disorganized majority that is 
Judicial Forum
In deciding a particular case the judicial forum is not charged with maximizing net social benefits but rather with the protection of legally established interests. The way courts perform this function is to interpret facts in the context of a rule of law so as to define the rights, duties, powers, and immunities of public and private decision makers. Before the external effects of pumping groundwater were well understood, courts developed and followed a rule which allowed landowners to take water from beneath their land in any amount and for any purpose. Once a better understanding of the resource showed that neighboring landowners may be severely damaged by unconstrained pumping, courts found it difficult to recognize these interests without damaging the property interests which had been granted under absolute ownership.
When new information makes an existing rule of law obsolete, legislatures, under their police powers, have a broader authority to change the law than do courts. However, while legislatures have the authority to protect the newly discovered interest, their sensitivity to concentration of interests may make them reluctant to do so if the existing interests are more concentrated than the emerging interests.
Special Purpose District as a Forum./br
The special purpose district (irrigation district, water conservation district, municipal water supply district, flood control district, etc.} differs from the legislative forum in that its boundaries have t•en drawn to include those who are affected by water-related decisions. Within the geographic boundaries, xoti!lg rights in the district may depend on whether one is a water user, and the weight of the vote may be related to the number of acres irrigated (that is the district may focus representation on direct beneficiaries). Another difference between transfers among special purpose districts and legislative transfers is that interdistrict transfers involve transactions: The exporting district is a seller, the importing district a buyer.
Contrasting the decision of an individual to sell water rights or commodity water with the same decision made by a district, we expect either one to require that their foregone direct benefits be compensated. For the district, minimum acceptable sale price may also reflect any foregone indirect benefits from diversions and instream flows as well as the foregone nonuser benefits felt by members of the district (indicated by superscript d in (7) 
For districts buying water rights we expect the district's willingness to pay to include direct benefits and also the in- markets, courts, legislatures, special purpose districts, and administrative agencies, were analyzed in terms of their capacity to generate and consider information concerning indirect and nonuser impacts of water transfers. All were found to be biased in the type of information generated and considered in decision making. Therefore the appropriate forum for decision making depends upon our priorities among values and on which values are likely to be at stake in particular issues.
To the extent that rural to urban water transfers have significant indirect and nonuser impacts, reliance upon markets will not serve broad social efficiency, since markets, while admirable processors of information on direct economic costs and benefits, tend to minimize and ignore third-party costs. 
